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Perry: Second Amendment

GUNS AND AMMO: FOR CONVICTED AMERICANS VIEWING
PICTURES OF OTHERS ENJOYING THEIR FUNDAMENTAL
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN A MAGAZINE
IS THE CLOSEST THEY WILL EVER GET TO SEEING THE
SECOND AMENDMENT AT WORK

SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE DIVISION, SECOND DEPARTMENT
People v. Hughes1
(decided April 19, 2011)
The defendant, Franklin Hughes, was convicted of possession
of a weapon in the second degree and in the third degree. 2 The
defendant appealed his conviction under Penal Law section 265.02(1)
and section 265.03(3), alleging that the statutes violated his Second
Amendment right, both under the United States Constitution and the
Civil Rights Law section 4. 3 The Appellate Division, Second
Department, rejected the defendant‘s argument, holding that Penal
Law section 265.02(1) and section 265.03(3) were constitutional. 4
The Second Department concluded that criminalizing the possession
1

921 N.Y.S.2d 300 (App. Div. 2d Dep‘t 2011).
Id. at 300; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.02(1) (McKinney 2011) which reads: ―A person is
guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree when: [s]uch person commits
the crime of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree . . . and has been
previously convicted of any crime.‖; N.Y. P ENAL LAW § 265.03(3) (McKinney 2011) which
provides, in pertinent part, a person is guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the
second degree when ―such person possesses any loaded firearm.‖ The defendant was
convicted of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree based on the provision
under sub division one, because he was previously convicted of a crime. Hughes, 921
N.Y.S.2d at 301.
3
Hughes, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 300; U.S. CONST. amend. II. (The Second Amendment to the
United States Constitution provides ―the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not
be infringed.‖); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS § 4 (McKinney 2011) (which provides ―the right of the
people to keep and bear arms cannot be infringed.‖).
4
Hughes, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 302.
2

665
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of a weapon by a person previously convicted of a crime did not
transgress the Second Amendment or New York Civil Rights Law.5
The court based its holding on the grounds that the statutes were not
―a complete ban on hand guns and [are], therefore, not a ‗severe
restriction‘ improperly infringing upon defendant‘s Second
Amendment rights.‖6
On July 8, 2009, the defendant, Franklin Hughes, was
convicted of criminal possession of a weapon in the second and third
degree. 7 The defendant had prior convictions for attempted
possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree and resisting
arrest.8 These prior convictions made it possible for the defendant to
be found guilty by the county court. 9 The Appellate Division,
Second Department, affirmed the decision handed down by the
county court finding the defendant guilty of criminal possession of a
weapon in the second and third degree.10
On appeal, the defendant alleged that Penal Law section
265.02(1) and Penal Law section 265.03(3) violated the United States
Constitution and the Civil Rights Law, section 4.11 The defendant‘s
argument was based on recent decisions by the United States
Supreme Court in District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v.
City of Chicago, Ill.12 The defendant‘s argument relied on these two
5

Id. at 301.
Id. at 301 (quoting People v. Perkins, 880 N.Y.S.2d 209, 210 (App. Div. 3d Dep‘t
2009)).
7
Id. at 300.
8
Daniel Wise, Gun Curb Survives High Court Decision, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 25, 2011
(explaining that the attempted possession of a control substance is a class E felony and the
resisting arrest charge was considered a class A misdemeanor); N.Y. P ENAL LAW §
220.06(1) (McKinney 2011) (―A person is guilty of criminal possession of a controlled
substance in the fifth degree when he knowingly and unlawfully possesses . . . a controlled
substance with intent to sell it.‖); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 205.30 (McKinney 2011) (―A person is
guilty of resisting arrest when he intentionally prevents or attempts to prevent a police
officer or peace officer from effecting an authorized arrest of himself or another person.‖).
9
Wise, supra note 8. It was the defendant‘s prior convictions for attempted possession of
a controlled substance in the fifth degree and resisting arrest that allowed him to be charged
and found guilty under section 265.02(1) and section 265.03(3). Id.; under the Penal Law
section 265.02(1) and section 265.03(3) to be found guilty of criminal possession there is a
requirement that the person has ―been previously convicted of any crime . . . .‖ Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
10
Hughes, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 300.
11
Id.
12
554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (holding that the United States Constitution‘s Second
Amendment grants a constitutionally protected individual right to keep and bear arms for
self-defense in the home); 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010) (holding that the Second
6
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decisions in making his appeal to have his criminal conviction
overturned. 13 The defendant argued that the Penal Law section
265.02(1) and Penal Law section 265.03(3) violated his Second
Amendment right to bear arms by making it a criminal penalty to
possess a firearm after committing a crime.14 The defendant claimed
the statutes in question were unconstitutionally overbroad because
they restrict the rights of anyone who has been convicted of any
crime.15
The Appellate Division, Second Department, denied the
defendant‘s claim and upheld the constitutionality of Penal Law
section 265.02(1) and Penal Law section 265.03(3). 16 The court
agreed with the defendant‘s position that Heller and McDonald did in
fact confer the basic individual right to bear arms for self-defense in
the home, but the Second Department refused to recognize that this
right was unlimited. 17 The Second Department relied on Justice
Scalia‘s majority opinion in Heller recognizing that the rights granted
by the Second Amendment were not unlimited. 18 This was the
foundation the court used to make their decision that Penal Law
sections 265.02(1) and 265.03(3) are constitutional.19
The Second Department relied on important dicta from Heller
that the Second Amendment was an individual right, which could be
regulated. 20 Of crucial importance was Justice Scalia‘s statement
regarding restrictions upon the Second Amendment that
[n]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt
on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of
firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws
forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places
such as schools and government buildings, or laws
imposing conditions and qualifications on the
Amendment is incorporated by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and is
fully applicable to the States); Hughes, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 301.
13
Hughes, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 301.
14
Id. at 300-01.
15
Id. at 301.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 921 N.Y.S.2d at 301; Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 (―[l]ike most rights, the right
secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited‖).
18
Hughes, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 301; Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27.
19
Hughes, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 301-02.
20
Id. at 301.
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commercial sale of arms.21
From Justice Scalia‘s opinion, the Second Department rationalized
that the Penal Laws were not in violation of the Second Amendment
right to bear arms. 22 The Second Department strengthened their
holding by utilizing People v. Perkins,23 a decision of the Appellate
Division, Third Department.24 The Second Department agreed with
the Third Department‘s opinion that ― ‗[u]nlike the statute at issue in
Heller, Penal Law article 265 does not effect a complete ban on
handguns and is, therefore, not a ‗severe restriction‘ improperly
infringing upon the defendant‘s Second Amendment rights.‘ ‖25 In
differentiating the two New York decisions from the Heller decision,
the Second Department recognized the issue presented by Heller
involved a complete ban, whereas the two New York jurisdictions
were not a total ban on possession of handguns.26
The Second Department reconciled the final claim made by
the defendant that the statues in question were unconstitutionally
overbroad. 27 The distinction the court enumerated in denying the
defendant‘s claim was based on the Penal Law, which defines a crime
as ―a misdemeanor or a felony.‖ 28 Accordingly, the Second
Department held that the phrase ―any crime‖ in the statue was not
overbroad and, therefore, was constitutional in accordance with the
Supreme Court‘s decision in Heller.29
The Supreme Court focused a lot of attention on District of
Columbia v. Heller, because it was the first major decision made on a
21

Id.; Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27.
Hughes, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 301-02.
23
Perkins, 880 N.Y.S.2d 209 (App. Div. 3d Dep‘t 2009).
24
Hughes, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 301; Perkins, 880 N.Y.S.2d at 210. The Appellate Division,
Third Department, handed down its decision in a case that was similar to Hughes. Id. The
defendant, Shawn Perkins, was convicted under criminal possession of a firearm in both the
second and third degree. Id. The defendant, upon appeal of his conviction put forth the
argument that the statutes he was convicted under, part of the same Penal Law codes Hughes
was convicted under, were in violation of his Second Amendment rights and Civil Rights
Law § 4. Id.
25
Hughes, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 301 (quoting Perkins, 880 N.Y.S.2d at 210).
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(6) (McKinney 2011). Section six reads: ― ‗Crime‘ means a
misdemeanor or a felony.‖ Id. The court in Hughes stressed this distinction to show that
―lesser matters such as violations and traffic infractions do not fall within the ambit of the
challenged statutes.‖ Hughes, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 301.
29
Hughes, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 301-02.
22
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Second Amendment issue by the Supreme Court since 1939.30 Prior
to the decision in Heller, the issue of firearms lay dormant for almost
seventy years. In 1939, the Supreme Court decided United States v.
Miller31 which was initiated in response to the National Firearms Act
of 1934.32
Miller involved two men, defendants Jack Miller and Frank
Layton, who were accused of transporting firearms in interstate
commerce. 33 The weapon being transported was an unregistered
twelve-gauge shotgun with a barrel less than eighteen inches in
length. 34 The shotgun the two men were transporting was
unregistered at the time, making it a violation under Title 26 of the
United States Code, the National Firearms Act.35 The police arrested
them in violation of this act.36 The charges against Miller and Layton
were dismissed by the district court, holding the Second Amendment
was violated by the Act.37
The United States argued on appeal that the purpose of the
Second Amendment was to effectuate a well-maintained militia, and
the shotguns were not being used for this purpose. 38 Justice
McReynolds agreed with this argument by noting that ―absen[t] any
evidence . . . [showing] possession or use of a ‗shotgun having a
30

United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
Id.
32
Id. at 175 n.1.
33
Id.
34
Id. The sawed-off shotgun was originally introduced in 1898, by Winchester for use by
police in riot control. People v. Cortez, 442 N.Y.S.2d 873, 874-75 (Sup. Ct. 1981). It soon
became an effective tool of the criminal element because ―[f]irst, the removal of the choke,
by cutting the barrel, exposes potential victims to greater peril. Second, cutting the barrel
and/or the stock makes it easier to conceal.‖ Id. A sawed-off shotgun is a standard shotgun
that has had the barrel of the gun altered by decreasing the length of the barrel. Id.
35
Miller, 307 U.S. at 175.
36
Brian L. Frye, The Peculiar Story of United States v. Miller, 3 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY
48, 49 (2008).
37
United States v. Miller, 26 F. Supp. 1002, 1002 (W.D. Ark. 1939), rev’d, 307 U.S. 174
(1939).
38
Miller, 307 U.S at 176. On appeal ―[t]he court gave Miller‘s counsel . . . two weeks to
submit his written brief and prepare for a grueling interrogation by the justices.‖ Robert A.
Levy, Second Amendment Haze, WASH. TIMES, June 17 2008. The defendant‘s counsel,
―who was court-appointed and had not been compensated, replied he had received neither
the government‘s brief nor a copy of the trial record. He wanted to file a brief, but doubted
he could travel all the way to Washington, D.C., for oral argument.‖ Id. The Supreme Court
responded to Gutensohn, offering a later date to present the case. Id. Gutensohn replied, by
telegram saying ― ‗[s]uggest case be submitted on [government‘s] brief. Unable to obtain
any money from clients to be present and argue case.‘ ‖ Id.
31
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barrel of less than eighteen inches in length . . . ‘ has some reasonable
relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated
militia, . . . the Second Amendment [does not] guarantee[] the right to
keep and bear such an instrument.‖39 The court held that the National
Firearms Act was constitutional and it did not violate the Second
Amendment.40
In the decision the court wrestled with how to apply the
Second Amendment in reference to a well-organized militia, which
the court felt was its purpose.41 Following Miller, courts ―struggle[d]
to decipher its holding.‖ 42 This decision remained the last major
decision on the Second Amendment until the Supreme Court decided
Heller in 2008.
Contrary to Miller, in People v. Hughes, 43 the Second
Department neglected to rule on any specific purpose or protection
provided by the Second Amendment or the New York Civil Rights
Law. 44 Instead, the Second Department focused on whether the
application of the statute prohibiting firearms under certain
circumstances was constitutional. 45
The Second Department
discussed only ―a policy determination by the Legislature that ‗an
illegal weapon is more dangerous in the hands of a convicted
criminal than in the possession of a novice to the criminal justice
system.‘ ‖ 46 While the Second Department relied heavily on the
decision in Heller, it did not narrow or clarify how the Heller
decision would apply to New York.47
At issue in Heller were statutes that provided for a complete
ban on the carrying of handguns and lawfully-possessed guns needed
to be disassembled or locked while not in use for lawful activities.48
39

Miller, 307 U.S at 178.
Id. at 183.
41
Id. at 178-79.
42
Frye, supra note 36, at 49. ―Some find Miller adopted an individual right theory of the
Second Amendment, some find it adopted a collective right theory, and some find it adopted
a hybrid theory, protecting the right to possess a firearm in connection with militia service.‖
Id. This would be one of the points that the Court in Heller would debate as well. See
Heller, 554 U.S. 570.
43
921 N.Y.S.2d 300 (App. Div. 2d Dep‘t 2011).
44
Id.
45
Id. at 301.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Heller, 554 U.S. at 575.
40
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The statutes at issue were challenged on the basis that they violated
the Second Amendment.49 Respondent, Dick Heller, was a special
police officer in the District of Columbia who was authorized as part
of his position to carry a firearm while on duty.50 He applied for
registration of a handgun to use in his home, but his application was
denied.51 This prompted him to bring his lawsuit against the District
of Columbia, challenging the statutes as a violation of the Second
Amendment right to bear arms.52
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether these
statutes violated the defendant‘s Second Amendment right to bear
arms.53 The Supreme Court recognized that there are two opposing
views on what the Second Amendment protects.54 First, there was
the view that was championed by the dissenting Justices in Heller,
that the protection offered by the Second Amendment only gave the
right to carry firearms in connection with activities of a militia.55
The second view was the view of the respondent that the
Second Amendment protects ―an individual right to possess a firearm
unconnected with service in a militia, and to use that arm for
traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the
home.‖56 This was the view of the majority in the decision.57 Justice
Scalia‘s majority opinion concluded that the primary purpose of the
Second Amendment is for self-defense.58
Historically, the rights secured by the Second Amendment are
not connected with service in the Militia.59 The Supreme Court, in its
analysis of the intent of the framers of the Second Amendment prior
to ratification, concluded from sources at the time that the Second
Amendment was advanced for the purposes of self-defense. 60 The
49
Id. at 575-76. The statutes that were at issue were ―D.C.Code §§ 7-2501.01(12), 72502.01(a), 7-2502.02(a)(4) (2001).‖ Id. at 575.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Heller, 554 U.S. at 575-76.
53
Id. at 576.
54
Id. at 577.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Heller, 554 U.S.at 595.
58
Id. at 630.
59
Id. at 582.
60
Id. at 606. This turns out to be the core right that the majority feels is protected by the
Second Amendment. Id. at 630.
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Supreme Court, in Heller, recognized that central to the Second
Amendment is an ―inherent right of self-defense.‖61 According to the
majority, the right that is granted is ―the right of law-abiding,
responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.‖62 In
Heller, the statutes in the District of Columbia amounted to a total
ban on use of weapons for self-defense in the home, which the
Supreme Court determined violated the Second Amendment.63 The
majority held that self-defense was ―the central component of the
right itself.‖ 64 The significance that the Supreme Court placed on
self-defense was an essential element in the court‘s holding.65
The Supreme Court‘s holding in Heller consisted of two
concepts as to what protections were offered under the Second
Amendment. 66 The first part of the holding was that the Second
Amendment confers upon an individual the right to keep and bear
arms.67 The other important part of the holding is that if a statute
either bans handgun possession in the home or renders a gun
inoperable in the home, the statute is in violation of the Second
Amendment.68
In making its decision that the Second Amendment grants
certain individual rights, the Supreme Court recognized that ―[l]ike
most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not
unlimited.‖69 This is an important component in analyzing whether
prohibitions on handgun ownership by a person previously convicted
of a crime violates the Constitution. The Court explicitly stated that
some prohibitions on gun ownership are acceptable.70 For example,
the Supreme Court noted that prohibitions on carrying of firearms by
61

Id. at 628.
Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
63
Id. at 628-29. The Court described the District of Columbia‘s statutory scheme by
stating that ―[f]ew laws in the history of our Nation have come close to the severe restriction
of the District‘s handgun ban.‖ Id. at 629.
64
Id. at 599.
65
Id. at 635.
66
Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
67
Id. This secures a person‘s right under the Second Amendment to keep and bear
firearms in their home in order to protect and defend. Id. at 628-29. The need for selfdefense in a person‘s home is the most ―acute‖ according the majority in Heller. Id. at 628.
68
Id. at 628-29.
69
Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. The Supreme Court also noted that ―[w]e identify these
presumptively lawful regulatory measures only as examples; our list does not purport to be
exhaustive.‖ Id. at 627 n.26.
70
Id. at 626-27.
62
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the mentally ill or felons are acceptable.71 The Supreme Court left
open many questions after Heller including a test or a standard to
determine what regulations are consistent with the Second
Amendment right to bear arms.
After Heller, one of the questions that remained was whether
this decision was intended to be binding on the states, through
incorporation into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 72 When the decision was handed down in 2008, the
Second Amendment was one of the few amendments that had not
been incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.73 This question was answered when the Supreme Court
handed down its plurality decision in McDonald v. City of Chicago,
Ill.74
The petitioners in the case were Chicago residents who
wanted to keep handguns in their home for the purpose of selfdefense.75 Defendants, the City of Chicago and Village of Oak Park,
had statutes in place that in essence were banned ownership of
handguns. 76 The City of Chicago enacted the ban on handgun
possession in order to protect residents of the city from property loss
71

Id. at 626.
McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3035 n.13. The Bill of Rights of the United States
Constitution at its inception only applied to the federal government, and the states were in no
way encumbered by it. Id. at 3028. It was not until after the Civil War and the adoption of
the Reconstruction Amendments that this view changed. Id. The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment became the avenue the Supreme Court utilized in order to
incorporate the protections offered by the Bill of Rights and apply them to the states. Id.
Originally, ― the only rights protected against state infringement by the Due Process Clause
were those rights ‗of such a nature that they are included in the conception of due process of
law.‘ ‖ Id. at 3031 (quoting Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908)). Slowly the
Supreme Court began to make the Bill of Rights applicable to the state through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, choosing to follow the theory of selective
incorporation. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3034. Even though the incorporation was selective,
out of the first eight amendments of the United States Constitution at the time McDonald
was decided, there were only three amendments remaining to be incorporated to the states.
Id. at 3035 n.13. The Supreme Court recognized that the only amendments that had not been
made applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
were the ―Sixth Amendment right to a unanimous jury verdict . . . the Third Amendment‘s
protection against quartering of soldiers; the Fifth Amendment‘s grand jury indictment
requirement; the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in civil cases; and the Eighth
Amendment‘s prohibition on excessive fines.‖ Id.
73
Id. at 3035 n.13
74
Id. at 3020.
75
McDonald, 130 S. Ct. 3026.
76
Id. at 3026.
72
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or death.77 The petitioner‘s argument was that the regulation did the
exact opposite of what it intended to do, making it harder for citizens
to protect themselves which was established by the Supreme Court‘s
decision in Heller. 78 The defendants argued that the statutes were
constitutional because they were not bound by the decision in Heller,
as the Second Amendment was not applicable to the states.79
The Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment is
incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment 80 and, therefore, is fully applicable to state actions. 81
The Supreme Court affirmed dicta in Heller that certain restrictions
on possession of firearms are acceptable, and the incorporation of the
Second Amendment would not ―imperil every law regulating
firearms.‖82
These two Supreme Court decisions establish an important
foundation for determining whether prior criminal convictions are a
valid ground for prohibition of ownership of firearms. Both cases
said that restrictions on the Second Amendment individual right were
appropriate, but the Court failed to lay out a foundation as to the type
of prohibitions would be considered constitutional.83

77

Id. at 3026.
Id. at 3026-27. The petitioners in the case were often ―the targets of threats and
violence.‖ Id. at 3026. The Court offered the example of petitioner, Otis McDonald, who
was in his late seventies. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3026-27. Mr. McDonald ―lives in a highcrime neighborhood. Id. at 3027. ―He is a community activist involved with alternative
policing strategies, and his efforts to improve his neighborhood have subjected him to
violent threats from drug dealers.‖ Id.
79
Id. at 3026-27.
80
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides ―[n]o State . . . shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . .‖.
81
McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3026. The opinion in McDonald was only a plurality. Id.
Justice Thomas agreed with the four justices in favor of incorporation. Id. The plurality
believed that the Second Amendment was incorporated to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment by way of Due Process Clause. Id. Justice Thomas agreed with incorporation,
but it would be incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendments Privileges and Immunities
Clause. Id. at 3058-59. Justice Thomas wrote ―the right to keep and bear arms is a privilege
of American citizenship that applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment‘s
Privileges or Immunities Clause.‖ McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3059.
82
Id. at 3047.
83
See Heller, 554 U.S. 570; McDonald, 130 S. Ct. 3020.
78
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After Heller, most of the circuits ruled that the possession of
firearms by a person convicted of a crime was not a violation of the
core right established in Heller.84 The decisions handed down by the
federal trial courts on the issue of possession of firearms by convicted
criminals mirror decisions in the circuit courts on the same issue.85
In reliance on Heller and McDonald, federal circuits have
consistently ruled that restricting possession of a firearm by a person
previously convicted of a crime is a valid restriction on the Second
Amendment right.86 The federal statutory provision on this issue that
has continually been called into question regarding its
constitutionality is section 922 of the United States Code titled
―Unlawful Acts.‖87 While the statute has often been challenged as
being unconstitutional since 2008, it has continued to withstand these
challenges.88
One of the first federal cases to deal with the issue of whether
a law denying people who have prior criminal convictions the right of
gun ownership violates the Second Amendment was a decision
handed down by Chief Judge Easterbrook in the United States v.
Skoien.89 Steven Skoien had been previously convicted on charges of
domestic violence.90 While on probation the defendant was found to
be in possession of three firearms and pled guilty to the charge that
84

See United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Chester, 628
F.3d 673 (4th Cir. 2010) (In order to differentiate the individual right of possession of a
firearm for self-defense, the courts focused on a person who was law-abiding or a
responsible citizen).
85
See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 570 F. Supp. 2d 161, 162 (D. Me. 2008) (holding
that a ―law prohibiting persons who have been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence survives Second Amendment scrutiny.‖); United States v. Smith, 742 F.
Supp. 2d 855, 861-62 (S.D. W. Va. 2010) (holding that the statute the defendant was charged
under was ―presumptively lawful‖); United States v. Tooley, 717 F. Supp. 2d 580, 598 (S.D.
W. Va. 2010) (holding that U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) was constitutional).
86
See, e.g., United States v. White, 593 F.3d 1199, 1206 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that the
regulation of possession of firearms by a person with a prior criminal history is not in
violation of a person‘s individual rights under the Second Amendment of the United States
Constitution).
87
18 U.S.C. § 922 (2011). The code reads in pertinent part: ―[i]t shall be unlawful for any
person . . . who has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence, to . . . [possess] . . . any firearm or ammunition . . . .‖ Id.
88
United States v. Marzzarella, 595 F. Supp. 2d 596, 598 (W.D. Pa. 2009) (holding that
every court which has considered a Second Amendment challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922, postHeller, has upheld the statute as constitutional).
89
Skoien, 614 F.3d 638.
90
Id. at 639.
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he violated 18 U.S.C. section 922(g)(9). 91 In determining whether
the statute the defendant was charged under was constitutional, the
court recognized that the Supreme Court left the issue open for lower
courts to decide. 92 By utilizing the limited guidance given by the
Supreme Court that ―some categorical disqualifications [on the
Second Amendment] are permissible,‖ the court in Skoien was able to
make its decision that the statute in question was constitutional. 93
The circuit court held that disqualification of the right to possess a
firearm upon criminal conviction is acceptable under the Heller
dicta.94
After the Seventh Circuit decided the issue in Skoien, it would
again have to make a ruling on a similar issue in United States v.
Williams. 95 This time the defendant, Adam Williams, made the
argument that a statute criminalizing his possession of a firearm as a
convicted felon was unconstitutional because this ―infringed on his
right to possess firearms for use in self-defense.‖96
In Williams, the defendant was the subject of a narcotics
investigation carried out by the Hammond, Indiana, Police
Department. 97 After the police gathered enough evidence, they
obtained a warrant and sought to arrest the defendant. 98 Upon
arriving at the defendant‘s place of residence, there was no answer
and the police knocked down the door. 99 The defendant was in
possession of a firearm, but put it down when he saw the police.100
The defendant claimed that he thought there was an intruder, and he
went to the bedroom for his gun for self-defense.101 The defendant‘s
91

Id. The defendant claimed he used his guns for hunting purposes, which is protected
under Heller, and that he was only convicted of misdemeanors, not felonies.
92
Id. at 640.
93
Id. at 641.
94
Skoien, 614 F.3d. at 645.
95
United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2010).
96
Id. at 691. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2011) states in part, ―It shall be unlawful for any
person . . . who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a
term exceeding one year . . . to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess
in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or
ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.‖
97
Williams, 616 F.3d. at 687.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 687.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 688. After the defendant‘s arrest, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
met him in jail to give him his Miranda Rights. Williams, 616 F.3d. at 687-88. Williams
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claim was that ―the statute criminalizing his possession of a firearm
as a convicted felon was unconstitutional because it infringed on his
right to possess firearms for use in self-defense.‖ 102 The court
rejected the defendant‘s argument and held that ―some categorical
disqualifications [on firearm possession] are permissible.‖103 In its
holding, the court agreed with the decision in Skoien that the right to
possession of a firearm was not absolute.104
One of the most recent cases addressing partial ban in the
light of Heller and McDonald, was in the Fourth Circuit‘s decision in
United States v. Chester.105 The defendant, William Samuel Chester,
had previously been convicted of domestic violence in West Virginia
in 2005. 106 The defendant argued that, in violation of the Second
Amendment, 18 U.S.C.A. section 922(g)(9) denied him possession of
firearms for self-defense.107 Aligning itself with its sister circuits in
addressing the defendant‘s claim, the Fourth Circuit held that the
defendant‘s right to bear arms was not being violated because
permissible restrictions are allowed under Heller.108
Following the federal example, New York courts have
generally decided that regulations on gun ownership by a person
convicted of a crime does not violate an individual‘s Second
Amendment rights.109 The first case in New York to deal with an
alleged Second Amendment violation, post Heller, was decided by
the Appellate Division, Third Department in People v. Perkins.110
Perkins involved a claim similar to the one presented in
Hughes. 111 In Perkins, the defendant alleged that his conviction
told ―agents that when the officers had arrived to execute the warrant, he believed that
someone was breaking into his house in an attempt to rob him, which is why he had retrieved
the gun from under his bed.‖ Id. at 688.
102
Id. at 691.
103
Id. (quoting Skoien, 614 F.3d at 641).
104
Williams, 616 F.3d at 692.
105
628 F.3d 673 (4th Cir. 2010).
106
Id. at 677. In 2007, the defendant was once again facing domestic violence charges
when the police were called to his residence after he threatened his wife. Id. at 676-77.
While searching the home the police discovered weapons, to which Chester admitted were
his. Id. at 677.
107
Id.
108
Chester, 628 F.3d at 682-83. The protection given to the right to bear arms in Heller
was a core right that was only granted to law abiding citizens. Id.
109
Perkins, 880 N.Y.S.2d at 210; Hughes, 921 N.Y.S. at 302.
110
Perkins, 880 N.Y.S.2d 209.
111
Id. at 210.
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under section 265 of the Penal Law violated the Second
Amendment.112 The defendant was convicted of criminal possession
of a weapon in the second and third degree.113 The court held that the
statutes the defendant was charged under did not violate the Second
Amendment or Civil Rights Law. 114
In discussing the
constitutionality of Penal Law section 265, the Third Department
recognized that the Penal Law was not a complete ban on
handguns. 115 The court found that the statute placed no ―severe
restriction‖ on the defendant‘s Second Amendment rights. 116 This
rationale would be followed by other courts in New York when
deciding whether denial of ownership of a firearm violates an
individual‘s Second Amendment rights.117
It was not long before another New York court would be
faced with determining the constitutionality of Penal Law section
265.02(1) and section 265.03(3). 118 Less than two years after
Perkins, the Second Department relied upon Perkins and held that the
Penal Law section 265.02(1) and section 265.03(3) were clearly
constitutional.119 Placing great reliance on the Third Department‘s
holding in Perkins, the Second Department acknowledged that the
statutes were not ―severe restriction[s]‖ on Hughes‘ Second
Amendment right to bear arms.120
After the holdings were handed down by the Second
Department in Hughes and Third Department in Perkins, the trial
courts in New York began to apply the decisions to similar Second
Amendment challenges.121 The criminal courts of Kings County and
112

Id.
Id.
114
Id.
115
Perkins, 880 N.Y.S.2d at 210.
116
Id.
117
People v. Gerlow, 925 N.Y.S.2d 243, 244 (App. Div. 3d Dep‘t 2011). ―Defendant‘s
. . . argument that Penal Law § 265.02 violates the Second Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution is unpreserved and, in any event, lacks merit.‖ Id. (citing Perkins, 62 A.D.3d
1160; Hughes, 83 A.D.3d 960).
118
Hughes, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 301.
119
Id. at 302.
120
Id. at 301.
121
See People v. Foster, 915 N.Y.S.2d 449 (Crim. Ct. Kings Cnty. 2010) (―This court
rejects as being without merit, defendant‘s argument that Penal Law § 265.01 violates the
Second Amendment of the United States Constitution.‖); People v. Nivar, 915 N.Y.S.2d 801
(Crim. Ct. Bronx Cnty. 2011) (―[T]his Court holds that neither PL § 265.01(1) nor AC §
10131(b) violates the Second Amendment and neither is unconstitutional as applied to
113
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Bronx County handed down decisions relying on Perkins in holding
that Penal Law section 265.01(1) did not violate either defendant‘s
Second Amendment rights.122 New York is not the only state to ban
possession of firearms by a person convicted of a crime. 123 Many
states have regulations that bar prior convicted criminals the right to
possess firearms, and these regulations have survived constitutional
challenges in light of the decision handed down in Heller.124
While, the current state of federal and state law is in
agreement that statutes that regulate possession of a firearm by a
person criminally convicted do not violate the Second Amendment,
the question remains as to how far a regulation may go before
becoming violative of the Second Amendment.
One way to analyze government regulations in light of the
Second Amendment is to determine whether ―the challenged
regulation burdens the core right protected by the Second
Amendment.‖125 The core right of the Second Amendment found in
Heller is self-defense in the home.126 If a regulation burdens this core
right then it would trigger a balancing test utilizing strict scrutiny to
determine how stringent the burden is on the person‘s individual
right.127 If the regulation does not burden this core right it would be
subject to a lesser level of scrutiny.128 Under a lesser level of scrutiny
any statute that did not burden this core right would be more likely to
survive a constitutional challenge. 129 The restriction at issue in
Heller denied the possession and use of firearms for protection in the
home which is inconsistent with the core purpose of the Second
Amendment.130 Arguably, the same can be said about the denial of
possession of firearms by a convicted criminal for self-defense
defendant.‖).
122
Id.
123
Farmer v. State, Dept. of Law, Office of Atty. Gen., 235 P.3d 1012 (Alaska 2010);
People v. Cross, 2010 WL 5113807 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. 2010); State v. Whitaker, 689 S.E.2d
395 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009).
124
E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 12316(b)(1); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-415.1; WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 9.41.040(4); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.23(1)(a).
125
Stephen Kiehl, In Search of a Standard: Gun Regulations After Heller and McDonald,
70 MD. L. REV. 1131, 1164 (2011).
126
Heller, 554 U.S. at 628-29.
127
Kiehl, supra note 125, at 1164.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Id.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2012

15

Touro Law Review, Vol. 28, No. 3 [2012], Art. 14

2012]

SECOND AMENDMENT

680

purposes in the home, requiring the court to weigh the restriction
against the government‘s objectives in order to determine whether the
burden on the core right serves a substantial government purpose.131
This, in essence, is what the court did in Hughes.132 The court
balanced the core right of gun ownership for self-defense purposes in
the home with the government‘s interest in keeping weapons out of
possession of prior convicted criminals.133 As explained in Hughes,
―the statutes represent a policy determination by the Legislature that
‗an illegal weapon is more dangerous in the hands of a convicted
criminal than in the possession of a novice to the criminal justice
system.‘ ‖134 Here, the interest of the government is a strong one in
keeping firearms out of the hands of criminals previously
convicted. 135 The government‘s interest is balanced against the
individual right secured under the Second Amendment. The outcome
of the balancing of the interests in this circumstance would allow the
government to infringe on the Second Amendment. Hughes can be
reconciled with Perkins because it is not a ―complete ban‖ on
firearms that is a ―severe restriction‖ on the Second Amendment.136
The burden/balance approach allows for regulations affecting the
concealed carrying of weapons in public or the licensing of guns
because these restrictions do not attack the core of the Second
Amendment protection in the home. 137 This approach also leaves
open ample channels to possess a firearm in the home for selfdefense.
The one problem facing federal and state courts on the issue
of firearm possession by criminals is the failure to distinguish
between violent and nonviolent crimes. 138 The statutes at issue in
131

Id. at 1165.
Hughes, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 302.
133
Id. at 301 (―Instead, as relevant to the discussion here, the statutes represent a policy
determination by the Legislature that ‗an illegal weapon is more dangerous in the hands of a
convicted criminal than in the possession of a novice to the criminal justice system.‘ ‖
(quoting People v. Montilla, 862 N.Y.S.2d 11 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2008))); Williams, 616 F.3d at
693 (extending Hughes to include ―those individuals who by their prior conduct had
demonstrated that they may not possess a firearm without being a threat to society.‖)
(quoting Landers v. State, 299 S.E.2d 707, 709-11 (Ga. 1983)).
134
Hughes, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 301 (quoting Montilla, 891 N.E.2d 1175).
135
Williams, 616 F.3d at 693.
136
Perkins, 880 N.Y.S.2d at 210.
137
Kiehl, supra at 125, at 1164.
138
See United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 685 (7th Cir. 2010) (Stating that ―while
felon-in-possession laws could be criticized as ‗wildly overinclusive‘ for encompassing
132
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Hughes also fail to provide any distinction. 139 The statutes that
Hughes was convicted under require that a defendant previously be
convicted of a crime. 140 In New York, a crime is defined as ―a
misdemeanor or felony,‖ without a distinction being made as to
whether the crime is violent or nonviolent. 141 This means that a
person, who was found guilty of fraud and served his sentence, would
be permanently prohibited from owning a firearm.142 This lack of
distinction between violent and nonviolent crimes is contrary to the
purpose of keeping firearms out of the hands of dangerous criminals.
Often times the punishment against firearm ownership is more
extreme and unfair than the actual punishment for the crime itself,
and often takes the right to bear arms away from nonviolent
offenders.143
One popular example was the highly publicized prosecution
of Martha Stewart.144 In the article, Why Can’t Martha Stewart Have
a Gun?, C. Kevin Marshall raises the question ―[i]s the public safer
now that Martha Stewart is completely and permanently
disarmed?‖145 This question does not apply to just Martha Stewart,
but also to many other citizens who have had their right to possess a
firearm in accordance with the Second Amendment violated due to a
conviction of a nonviolent crime. While Justice Scalia‘s opinion in
Heller acknowledged that certain provisions could be placed on
handgun ownership, this seems to be a ―categorical ban‖ of a
complete class of people.146 If one were to broadly interpret the dicta
nonviolent offenders, every state court in the modern era to consider the propriety of
disarming felons under analogous state constitutional provisions has concluded that step to
be permissible.‖)
139
Hughes, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 301.
140
Id.
141
Id. (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00[6] (2008)).
142
18 U.S.C. § 922; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.01; White, 593 F.3d at 1205-06. The court
explained that the statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), ―does not distinguish between the violent
and non-violent offender. Thus, both an armed robber and tax evader lose their right to bear
arms on conviction under § 922(g)(1).‖
143
C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can’t Martha Stewart Have A Gun?, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL‘Y 695, 695-96 (2009). In 2004, Martha Stewart was convicted of obstruction of justice,
making false statements, and two counts of conspiracy. Id. Martha Stewart served her
sentence, a term of five months, but would be banned from possessing a firearm for life in
compliance with federal law. Id.
144
Id. at 695.
145
Id. at 696.
146
Heller, 554 U.S. at 628-29.
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in Heller, this line of ruling by the courts goes against the interpreted
purpose of the Second Amendment – to allow a person to possess a
firearm for use in a home for the purpose of self-defense.147
In United States v. Yancey, 148 the restriction on a
constitutional freedom seems to be taken to the fullest extent
possible. 149
The Seventh Circuit was presented with the
constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. section 922(g)(3), 150 which prohibits
any person ―who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled
substance‖ from possessing a firearm. 151 The defendant, Matthew
Yancey, was arrested and charged under 18 U.S.C. section 922(g)(3)
for having a pistol in connection with being under the influence of
marijuana.152 The defendant argued that the statute he was convicted
under violated his Second Amendment right because he was not a
felon and even though he was in public the weapon he was carrying
was a ―commonplace‖ weapon. 153 The Seventh Circuit upheld the
defendant‘s conviction and the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. section
922(g)(3), even though the decision seems to be completely at odds
with Heller and McDonald.154
The court‘s decision emphasizes that section 922 was
designed to achieve ―the broad objective of . . . suppressing armed
violence . . . [that] is without doubt an important one.‖155 In addition,
the court stated ―that keeping guns away from habitual drug abusers
is substantially related to that goal [of suppressing violence].‖156 The
court analogized that by keeping guns away from a person who was a
drug user is the same as keeping guns out of the hands of a convicted
felon.157 This reasoning in Yancey incorrectly stretches the narrow
purpose of keeping firearms out of the hands of persons convicted of
147

Id. at 635.
621 F.3d 681 (2010).
149
Id. at 682. ―Matthew Yancey pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm as an unlawful
user of marijuana . . .‖ Id. In June 2008, Police officers executed an arrest warrant for
Yancey. Id. At the time of his arrest, Yancey was carrying a loaded pistol and 0.7 grams of
marijuana. Id. Yancey confessed that he was habitual marijuana user. Yancey, 621 F.3d at
682.
150
Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) (2011).
151
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3).
152
Yancey, 621 F.3d at 682.
153
Id.
154
Id. at 687.
155
Id. at 684.
156
Id.
157
Yancey, 621 F.3d at 684.
148
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violent crimes to cover a group of people never convicted of a crime,
but presumed that because they are under the influence of a substance
that they will commit a crime and be in this position eventually.158
The court noted that drug users, similarly to mentally ill persons are
more likely to have trouble exercising self-control.159
With the confusion in the courts as to what type of limitations
are allowed, problems arise where the heart of self-defense is
violated. There is much disagreement about where to draw the line.
The National Rifle Association (hereinafter ―NRA‖) argues that there
is ―no evidence that ‗gun control‘ reduces crime, suicides or
accidents in the U.S. or abroad.‖160 The NRA is an organization that
describes itself ―as America‘s foremost defender of Second
Amendment rights.‖161 The view of the NRA heavily leans toward
expanding Second Amendment rights, and the NRA was one of the
foremost supporters of the decision handed down in Heller.162 In an
article, dated March 23, 2011, the NRA criticized the proposed ―The
Fix Gun Checks Act of 2011.‖163 The NRA claimed the act
would greatly expand the definition of those legally
prohibited from owning firearms to include anyone
who‘s ever been arrested—even if never convicted or
found guilty—for drug possession within a five year
period. . . And it would seem fears that any new
national gun control legislation would be used to limit
the gun rights of law abiding citizens is at least
partially justified.164
Prohibitions on people who can own firearms are a major concern of
supporters of the Second Amendment. These prohibitions combined
158

Id. at 685.
Id.
160
NRA-ILA: Firearm Fact Card 2011, NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION, http://www.nraila.
org/Issues/FactSheets/Read.aspx?ID=83 (last visited September 25, 2011).
161
A Brief History of the NRA, NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION, http://www.nra.org/
Aboutus.aspx (last visited September 25, 2011).
162
NRA-ILA: Victory In The Supreme Court!, NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION INSTITUTE
FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION, http://www.nraila.org/Legislation/Federal/Read.aspx?id=4052
(last visited September 25, 2011).
163
NRA-ILA: New Gun Control Legislation Would Prohibit Those Arrested but not
Convicted, NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION INSTITUTE FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION,
http://www.nraila.org/News/Read/NewsReleases.aspx?ID=14930 (last visited September 25,
2011).
164
Id.
159
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with court decisions similar to the decision in Yancey could
foreshadow how the Second Amendment will be dealt with in the
future. The Second Amendment in its current state raises important
issues to be considered such as the collateral consequences that are
associated with being convicted of a crime.
There are collateral consequences that will flow from the
decision handed down in Hughes. Decisions in the federal and state
courts to deny convicted criminals possession of firearms will bring
about new collateral consequences in the criminal justice system.
While these collateral consequences are not mentioned in Hughes,
they are of significant importance to a practicing attorney. When a
defendant is going through the criminal justice system because of a
criminal charge, the lawyer will need to make that person aware that
there are additional consequences of accepting a plea bargain. A
defendant who pleads guilty to a lesser criminal charge needs to be
informed of the collateral consequences that will be associated with
his plea.165 In essence, under the current law when a person accepts a
plea bargain in the criminal justice system he or she will essentially
be surrendering his or her Second Amendment right.166 It becomes
important to notify defendants of this collateral consequence of
accepting a plea that is a consequence similar to the loss of voting
rights or professional licenses for guilty convictions.
The holding handed down by the court in Hughes was the
right outcome in a new, unclear area of constitutional law. The
Supreme Court has failed to offer much guidance regarding the
questions left open in Heller and McDonald. While the Second
Department in Hughes did an effective job providing some answers
to the questions left open in Heller, it was merely a beginning point.
Currently, there is no clear test endorsed by the Supreme Court for
dealing with restrictions on the Second Amendment. While there
seems to be unity in many of the state and federal courts, that could
change. The further removed one is from these decisions on the
Second Amendment, the more questions presented to the courts
regarding what regulations are reasonable and unreasonable in light
of the underlying purpose will arise. The legal system in the future
will need to decide whether a person convicted of a violent crime is
any different from a person in possession of a weapon convicted of a
165
166

Marshall, supra at 143, at 695.
Id.
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nonviolent crime. In the area of possession of firearms by prior
criminals there are still many questions to be answered.
Ronald P. Perry*
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